Best Practice Principles & Stewardship Codes
Best Practice Principles & Stewardship Codes
Glass Lewis has issued statements on a variety of global stewardship codes, and is a charter signatory of the Best Practice Principles for Shareholder Voting Research & Analysis, which were launched in March 2014.
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Swiss Stewardship Code Statement
Best Practice Principle
Glass Lewis’ Statement of Compliance with the Best Practice Principles for Providers of Shareholder Voting Research & Analysis details how Glass Lewis applies each of the three principles of Service Quality, Conflicts of Interest Management, and Market Communications and all related guidance to the work we perform on behalf of our clients.
Statements of Compliance are available for the following years:
2024 (current)20232022202120202019Statements of Compliance are available for the following years:
The Best Practice Principles Group (BPPG) website provides details on the principles, an overview of how they were developed and lists members and signatories. Visit the BPPG website.
UK Stewardship Code Statement
Glass Lewis’ annual Statement on the UK Stewardship Code. The Code was published by the Financial Reporting Council in July 2010 and last updated in 2020. The purpose of the UK Stewardship Code is to promote greater transparency among investor groups with respect to the handling of responsible investment activities.
France AMF Recommendation for Proxy Advisors
Glass Lewis’ Statement on AMF Recommendation No. 2011-06 on proxy advisory firms, issued by the Autorité des Marches Financiers (“AMF”) in March 2011. The purpose of the AMF Recommendation is to secure greater transparency with regard to the operation and role of proxy advisors.
Japan Stewardship Code Statement
Glass Lewis’ Statement on Japan’s Stewardship Code, published by the Council of Experts on the Stewardship Code in February 2014 and last updated in June 2025. The Code was published in an effort to endorse greater transparency among investor groups with respect to the handling of responsible investment activities.
Korea Stewardship Code Statement
Glass Lewis’ Statement on Korea’s Stewardship Code, published by the Korea Stewardship Code Council on December 16, 2016, in an effort to enhance investor stewardship, reflecting the responsibility of institutional investors to engage constructively with invested companies.
US AI Oversight Through Three Lenses: Investor Expectations, the S&P 100 and Company-Specific Analysis
This article examines U.S. investor expectations for board oversight of artificial intelligence, analyzes AI governance disclosures among S&P 100 companies, and highlights company-specific approaches to managing AI-related risks and opportunities.
US AI Oversight Through Three Lenses: Investor Expectations, the S&P 100 and Company-Specific Analysis
This article examines U.S. investor expectations for board oversight of artificial intelligence, analyzes AI governance disclosures among S&P 100 companies, and highlights company-specific approaches to managing AI-related risks and opportunities.
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Examining What Drove Significant Shareholder Opposition to S&P/ASX 300 Director Elections in Australia
This article provides data and analysis on director voting, along with discussion of the themes and concerns that drove shareholder opposition.
Examining What Drove Significant Shareholder Opposition to S&P/ASX 300 Director Elections in Australia
This article provides data and analysis on director voting, along with discussion of the themes and concerns that drove shareholder opposition.
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Preparing for Proxy Season: A Primer for North American Companies
This guide to covers how North American companies can leverage effective communication channels to proactively engage with shareholders before and during proxy season.
Preparing for Proxy Season: A Primer for North American Companies
This guide to covers how North American companies can leverage effective communication channels to proactively engage with shareholders before and during proxy season.
How Plurality Voting Allows Directors to Stay on the Board Without Majority Support
This article looks at the drivers and implications of majority-unsupported directors, with a focus on the use of plurality voting and governance practices that undermine board accountability.
How Plurality Voting Allows Directors to Stay on the Board Without Majority Support
This article looks at the drivers and implications of majority-unsupported directors, with a focus on the use of plurality voting and governance practices that undermine board accountability.