Glass Lewis Response to TX SB 2337

May 21, 2025
/
3
 min read
By
Glass Lewis

As part of a campaign to attract companies to relocate to, incorporate in, and list on a new Texas-based exchange, the Texas legislature is rushing through a number of corporate governance measures. A bill set to become law would permit Texas-based and listed public companies to amend their governing documents to impose much greater ownership thresholds on shareholders seeking to submit proposals. Other bills, including one already signed into law, would insulate Texas companies and their boards from private litigation.

Among these is a new measure that purports to regulate proxy advisors, but that could have far-reaching implications for our institutional investor clients, as well as other parts of the stewardship eco-system.  Glass Lewis is concerned that this bill is being rushed through the legislative process with no consultation with proxy advisors or their clients. It is wholly unworkable, conflicts with federal securities laws, and would serve no useful purpose, while creating unnecessary costs for proxy advisors and investors.

Below is the text of a letter Glass Lewis sent to Members of the Texas House Committee currently considering the bill.

May 15, 2025

By Email to:

Rep. Todd Hunter (Chair): todd.hunter@house.texas.gov

Rep. Toni Rose (Vice Chair): toni.rose@house.texas.gov

Rep. Terry Canales: terry.canales@house.texas.gov

Rep. Stan Gerdes: stan.gerdes@house.texas.gov

Rep. Cody Harris: cody.harris@house.texas.gov

Rep. Ana Hernandez: ana.hernandez@house.texas.gov

Rep. Ann Johnson: ann.johnson@house.texas.gov

Rep. Jeff Leach: jeff.leach@house.texas.gov

Rep. Janie Lopez: janie.lopez@house.texas.gov

Rep. Ramon Romero, Jr.: ramon.romero@house.texas.gov

Rep. Carl Tepper: carl.tepper@house.texas.gov

Members of the Committee on Calendars

Texas House of Representatives

Austin, TX 78768

Re: Senate Bill No. 2337

Dear Chairman Hunter, Vice Chair Rose, and Members of the Committee –

On behalf of Glass Lewis, a leading proxy advisor, I write to express our significant concern with Senate Bill No. 2337, which I understand is now before the Committee on Calendars. This bill is apparently being rushed through the legislative process without consultation with proxy advisors or the institutional investors they serve. It conflicts with federal law and would serve no useful purpose, while creating unnecessary costs and other possible unintended consequences for all stakeholders in the proxy process. We urge you to not schedule this bill for floor consideration.

SB 2337 rests on two premises, one more novel and dubious than the next. The first provision, in Section 101, is based on the idea that any advice on a proxy proposal that is even partly based on an environmental, social or governance factor is not being made in the financial interest of the company’s shareholders. But that is an extreme and perhaps unprecedented position. To cite just one example, the first Trump Administration’s Department of Labor, under the leadership of then-Secretary Eugene Scalia, acknowledged that environmental factors may have an impact on shareholders' financial interests, citing the example of “a company’s improper disposal of hazardous waste.” [1] Or one can look to the $63 billion in costs borne by BP and its shareholders due to the Deepwater Horizon disaster to see how environmental and safety factors can have profound effects on shareholders’ financial interests.[2] Most institutional shareholders today – who often have their own legal responsibilities as fiduciaries to safeguard pensioners’ and other individuals’ investments – believe that effective and robust oversight of environmental and social risks is critical to ensuring the long-term viability of companies and that a failure to mitigate these risks poses real risks to enterprise and shareholder value. The notion that corporate governance cannot be a material consideration for a company’s shareholders is even more extreme. We cannot think of any institutional investor that holds that view.[3]

Nonetheless, SB 2337 would mandate that any such routine advice be accompanied by a “warning” notice to our clients – who are sophisticated institutional investors who have asked for that advice – with the often counterfactual statement that the advice we are providing them is not "solely in the financial interest of the shareholders of the company." This would be pointless, misleading and costly.  Why would an asset manager that is voting solely for the financial benefit of its client, but who disagrees with SB 2337’s extreme position that no environmental, social or governance factor can ever be material, be forced to receive a stream of notices falsely suggesting it is not acting in shareholders’ financial interest? Likewise, if a religious institution or its asset manager engages us to provide them recommendations under our Catholic Policy, what possible interest would be served by requiring us to warn them each time we make a recommendation to them under the policy they’ve chosen to adhere to their religious beliefs? Worse yet, the bill would also require proxy advisors to provide “immediate” notices to Texas companies when they advise their clients based on these common considerations, a measure that would be costly, disruptive, and could breach a proxy advisor’s duty of confidentiality to its client.

Section 102 is even more problematic. It requires a similar warning notice to our clients, companies, and the Texas Attorney General whenever we provide different advice to different clients that have not "expressly requested services for a nonfinancial purpose." It also mandates that proxy advisors decide and disclose which of the differing recommendations was in the financial interest of shareholders.

A significant majority of Glass Lewis’s 1300+ clients have their own custom voting policy, meaning they have chosen to receive recommendations based on a policy other than our benchmark policy. This is widely considered a best practice. It ensures that our clients - who have different investment strategies and time horizons, as well as their own views on proxy voting issues - are receiving recommendations based on their own unique needs and views on corporate governance issues.

SB 2337, however, would turn this common understanding on its head, taking the unprecedented position that serving our clients in this manner is a “conflict” and mandating that those clients, who have asked for this service, be warned about it. SB 2337 compounds this by forcing proxy advisors to decide and disclose which of their clients are receiving advice in the financial interest of shareholders. Even the largest, most sophisticated asset managers vote differently on proxy voting matters all the time, consistent with the SEC’s views that there is no “correct viewpoint” on these matters.[4] SB 2337 would – irrationally and at the risk of spurring unwarranted litigation – mandate that their proxy advisor somehow decide and publicize which of them is acting in shareholders’ financial interest.

Finally, we note that the bill, in its current form, has significant technical flaws that could cause unintended consequences. In particular, SB 2337 defines “proxy advisor” and “proxy advisory service” so broadly as to capture a number of players in the proxy voting ecosystem – not just Glass Lewis and its competitors – that we assume Texas has no intention of covering. A deliberative, considered legislative process would allow these flaws to be fixed.

We urge you to decline to schedule the bill for placement on the House calendar and to return the bill to the Trade, Workforce & Economic Development Committee for further consideration. We would be pleased to meet with you to further discuss this bill at any time. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Nichol Garzon

Chief Legal Officer, SVP, Corporate Development


[1] Department of Labor, Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39113 (June 30, 2020) (“Trump DOL Rule preamble”).

[2] See https://www.wsj.com/articles/bp-to-book-1-7-billion-charge-for-deepwater-horizon-claims-1516091386?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

[3] See also Trump DOL Rule preamble (“Dysfunctional corporate governance can likewise present pecuniary risk that a qualified investment professional would appropriately consider on a fact-specific basis.”)

[4] As the SEC has long recognized, “Of course, much commentary concerning corporate performance, management capability or directorial qualifications or the desirability of a particular initiative subject to a shareholder vote is by its nature judgmental. As to such opinions, there typically is not a ‘correct’ viewpoint.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation of Communication among Shareholders, Release No. 34-31326 (Oct. 22, 1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 at 48,278 (internal quotations omitted).